Abstract: In the games with population uncertainty introduced in this paper, the number and identity of the participating players are determined by chance. Games with population uncertainty are shown to include Poisson games and random-player games. The paper focuses on those strategy pro¯les that are most likely to yield a Nash equilibrium in the game selected by chance. Existence of maximum likelihood equilibria is established under mild topological conditions.
Introduction
In games with incomplete information as usually studied by game theorists, the characteristics or types of the participating players are possibly subject to uncertainty, but the number of players is common knowledge. Recently, however, Myerson [8, 9, 10, 11] and Milchtaich [7] proposed models for situations | like elections and auctions | in which it may be inappropriate to assume common knowledge of the player set. In such games with population uncertainty, the set of actual players and their preferences are determined by chance according to a commonly known probability measure (a Poisson distribution in Myerson's work, a point process in Milchtaich's paper) and players have to choose their strategies before the player set is revealed.
The equilibrium concepts introduced by Myerson [11] and Milchtaich [7] for their classes of games with population uncertainty are variants of the Nash equilibrium concept based on a suitably de¯ned expected utility function for the players. Alternatively, the present note stresses those strategy pro¯les that are most likely to yield an equilibrium in the game selected by chance. Maximum likelihood equilibria were introduced in Borm et al. [2] in a class of Bayesian games. Gilboa and Schmeidler [5] recently provided an axiomatic foundation for rankings according to the likelihood function.
The ¾-algebra underlying the chance event that selects the actual game to be played may be too coarse to make the event in which a speci¯c strategy pro¯le yields an equilibrium measurable. A common mathematical approach (also used in a decision theoretic framework; cf. [4] ) to assign probabilities to such events is to use the inner measure induced by the probability measure (cf. [6] ). Roughly, the inner measure of an event E is the probability of the largest measurable event included in E.
Under mild topological restrictions, an existence result for maximum likelihood equilibria is derived. Since the result establishes the existence of a maximum of the likelihood function, it di®ers signi¯cantly from standard equilibrium existence results that usually rely on a¯xed point argument.
The note is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls de¯nitions and results from topology and measure theory. Section 3 contains the de¯nition of games with population uncertainty. These games are shown to include the Poisson games of Myerson [11] and the random-player games of Milchtaich [7] . In Section 4, maximum likelihood equilibria are de¯ned and shown to exist under mild topological restrictions on a game with population uncertainty.
Preliminaries
For easy reference, this section summarizes results and de¯nitions from topology and measure theory that are used in the rest of the paper. See [1, 6] for additional information.
Let X and Y be topological spaces. A function f : X ! Y is sequentially continuous if for every x 2 X and every sequence (x n ) 1 n=1 in X converging to x, it holds that lim n f(x n ) = f(x). Sequential continuity is implied by continuity of functions; the converse is not true [ Let (-; §; P ) be a probability space, where -is a nonempty set, § is a ¾-algebra on -, and P a probability measure on §. The inner measure P ¤ (E) of a set E µ -is de¯ned as
Roughly speaking, the inner measure of an event E is the probability of the largest measurable event contained in E. P ¤ (E) is well-de¯ned, since the set fP (F ) j F 2 §; F µ Eg is nonempty (; 2 §; ; µ E) and bounded above by one (P is a probability measure). Moreover,
Inner measures and lower integrals are related via the following equality:
where 1 E is the indicator function for the set E.
Below, a version of Fatou's Lemma is shown to hold for lower integrals. First, a lemma is needed.
Then there exists a Lebesgue integrable function h : -! R such that h 6 f, and
Proof. By (1) there is a sequence (h n ) 1 n=1 of Lebesgue integrable functions such that h n 6 f and
be a sequence of functions f n : -! R and g : -! R a Lebesgue integrable function such that f n 6 g for all n 2 N. Then
Proof. Lemma 2.1 implies that for each n 2 N there exists a Lebesgue integrable function h n with h
, the classical Fatou Lemma applies:
Since lim sup n f n¸l im sup n h n and lim sup n h n is Lebesgue integrable, it follows from (1) and
Combining (4) and (5) yields the desired result. 2
Games with Population Uncertainty
In this section, games with population uncertainty are formally de¯ned. Subsequently, games with population uncertainty are brie°y compared with the random-player games of Milchtaich [7] and the Poisson games of Myerson [11] . The set of potential players is a nonempty set N . Each potential player i 2 N has a nonempty strategy set A i . The actual player set is determined by chance according to a probability space (-; §; P ). To each state ! 2 -is associated a strategic game G ! = hN ! ; A ! ; (º i;! ) i2N ! i with a nonempty set of actual players N ! µ N having strategy space A ! := £ i2N! A i and each player i 2 N ! having a preference relation º i;! over A ! . The tuple hN; (A i ) i2N ; -; §; P; (G ! ) !2-i is a game with population uncertainty.
This de¯nition captures the idea that is also present in the work of Myerson [11] and Milchtaich [7] on games with population uncertainty: there is uncertainty about the exact state of nature ! 2 -, and consequently about the game G ! = hN ! ; A ! ; (º i;! ) i2N! i that will be played. Analogous to the related literature, the probability measure P , according to which the state of nature is determined, is assumed to be common knowledge among the potential players.
Some additional notation: A := £ i2N A i denotes the collection of strategy pro¯les of the potential players. Assume the potential players have¯xed a strategy pro¯le a = (a i ) i2N . For notational convenience, denote by a ! := (a i ) i2N ! the strategy pro¯le of the players engaged in the game G ! = hN ! ; A ! ; (º i;! ) i2N! i that is played if state ! 2 -is realized. The best response correspondence of G ! is denoted by BR ! : A ! ¶ A ! , i.e.,
where (a ! ) ¡i = (a j ) j2N ! nfig denotes the strategy pro¯le of the players in N ! n fig.
Games with population uncertainty as de¯ned above generalize the Poisson games of Myerson [11] and the random-player games of Milchtaich [7] . Milchtaich [7, p. 5] introduces randomplayer games as consisting of: ² a compact metric space X of potential players; ² a simple point process (cf. [3] ) on X that determines the actual set of players; ² strategy sets de¯ned by means of a continuous function » from a compact metric space Y to X. The strategy set of player i 2 X equals » ¡1 (fig); ² bounded and measurable payo® functions giving a payo® u(s; S) to an actual player who plays s when the strategies of the other players are S.
Every random-player game is easily seen to be a game hN; (A i ) i2N ; -; §; P; (G ! ) !2-i with population uncertainty: set N equal to X, A i equal to » ¡1 (fig), identify (-; §; P ) with the distribution of the simple point process, and the preferences with the utility functions u. Milchtaich [7, p.6, Example 3] indicates that the Poisson games of Myerson [11] are random-player games and consequently games with population uncertainty.
Maximum Likelihood Equilibria
The equilibrium concepts introduced by Myerson [11] and Milchtaich [7] for their classes of games with population uncertainty are variants of the Nash equilibrium concept based on a suitably de¯ned expected utility function for the players. This section presents an alternative approach by stressing those strategy pro¯les that are most likely to yield a Nash equilibrium in the game selected by chance. Maximum likelihood equilibria were introduced in Borm et al. [2] for a class of Bayesian games and were considered more recently in Voorneveld [12] . In this section we de¯ne maximum likelihood equilibria for games with population uncertainty and provide an existence result. Consider a game hN; (A i ) i2N ; -; §; P; (G ! ) !2-i with population uncertainty. The players in N must plan their strategies in ignorance of the stochastic state of nature ! that is realized. A strategy pro¯le a = (a i ) i2N 2 A gives rise to a Nash equilibrium if the realized state of nature is an element of the set
How likely is this event? Although this set need not be measurable (i.e., and element of the ¾-algebra §), a common mathematical approach in such cases is to de¯ne its likelihood via its inner measure
the probability of the largest measurable set of states of nature in which the strategy pro¯le a = (a i ) i2N gives rise to a Nash equilibrium. See [4] for another paper using inner measures in a decision theoretic framework. Formally, de¯ne the Nash likelihood function L :
and de¯ne a = (a i ) i2N to be a maximum likelihood equilibrium if
In a recent paper, Gilboa and Schmeidler [5] provided an axiomatic foundation for rankings according to the likelihood function. The following theorem provides an existence result for maximum likelihood equilibria. (¯) for every ! 2 -the graph gph
(°) for every ! 2 -the function from A to A ! de¯ned by a 7 ! a ! is sequentially continuous, then the set of maximum likelihood equilibria is nonempty.
Proof. The set fL(b) j b 2 Ag is nonempty and bounded above by one. Hence its supremum exists. Let (a n ) 1 n=1 be a sequence in A such that lim n L(a n ) = sup b2A L(b). Since A is sequentially compact by (®), the sequence (a n ) 1 n=1 has a subsequence converging to an element a 2 A. Without loss of generality, this subsequence is taken to be (a n ) 1 n=1 itself: lim n a n = a. This a 2 A is shown to be a maximum likelihood equilibrium.
For each ! 2 -and b ! 2 A ! it holds by de¯nition that
We show that for every ! 2 -, the function from A ! to f0; 1g de¯ned by
is sequentially upper semicontinuous. Fix ! 2 -and a sequence (b
is a sequence in f0; 1g, the inequality trivially holds if 
Since gph BR ! is sequentially closed by (¯), this implies that lim k (b
gph BR ! , contradicting the assumption that 1 gph BR! (b ! ; b ! ) = 0. This settles the preliminary work. In the sequence of (in)equalities below, ² the¯rst equality is (6), ² the second equality follows from (2) and (7), ² the¯rst inequality follows from sequential upper semicontinuity of
and the fact that a n ! ! a ! , since a n ! a and a 7 ! a ! is sequentially continuous by (°), ² the second inequality follows from Fatou's Lemma for lower integrals (Proposition 2.2),
² the third equality follows from (2), (6) , and (7),
The following (in)equalities hold: But then a 2 A is a maximum likelihood equilibrium of hN; (A i ) i2N ; -; §; P; (G ! ) !2-i. 2
A compactness condition like (®) is standard in equilibrium existence results. The sequential continuity condition (°) guarantees that a convergent sequence of strategy pro¯les in A is projected to a convergent sequence of strategy pro¯les in the games (G ! ) !2-that are realized in the di®erent states of nature. This condition is automatically ful¯lled if for instance the topologies on A and (A ! ) !2-are taken to be the product topologies of those on the strategy spaces A i of the players i 2 N . The closedness condition (¯) on the graphs of best response correspondences (BR ! ) !2-is closely related to the upper semicontinuity conditions imposed on best response correspondences in equilibrium existence proofs using the Kakutani¯xed point theorem. As a consequence, even though the existence proof of maximum likelihood equilibria signi¯cantly di®ers from existence proofs involving a¯xed point argument, the basic conditions driving the result are the same.
